Communication, transparency, accountability: monetary policy in the twenty-first century by Otmar Issing
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL, PART 1  2005 65
Communication, Transparency, Accountability:
Monetary Policy in the Twenty-First Century
Otmar Issing
In present times, as in the past, the role of
information can hardly be overestimated. In our
age of new media technology, the increase in the
speed, scope, and volume of communication has
been dramatic. These days, no significant insti-
tution—be it public or private, be it a central bank
or a sports club—can survive without a press
office. Media advisers are ubiquitous: They thrive
on the belief that, if need be, even poor results
can be given a positive spin, while incontestable
successes will fail to have the desired effect if not
communicated in the right way.
Since their beginning, churches have been
especially aware of the importance of communi-
cation; and at the start of a new religion, the main
aim is often to spread the gospel by word and
deed, by sermon and miracle.1 Do something
good and talk about it. Be transparent—but only
about the good deed?—and be accountable for
your actions.
In the language of economists, such maxims
quickly translate into complicated formulae and
complex models. This should come as no surprise
to anyone, as behind nearly every simple wisdom
there lies an intricate web of complex relations.
This paper starts off with some general




ow do agents deal with new information
that may be of relevance to others? How
do they convey their knowledge to the
public? And what are the effects of such commu-
nication? Two very different historical examples
illustrate the persistent relevance of this question.
In 67 BC, as piracy posed an ever greater threat
to the supply of grain, the Roman authorities
assigned command of a huge naval force to Gnaeus
Pompeius, who then rid the Mediterranean of
pirates within 40 days (see Issing, 1985). One year
later, in his first political speech, Marcus Tullius
Cicero asserted that the mere announcement of
Pompeius’s nomination for that mission had sent
the price of grain in Rome plummeting on the
same day.
In 1860, Lady Wilberforce, wife of the Bishop
of Worchester, learned of Charles Darwin’s new
theory. She is said to have exclaimed: “Descended
from the apes! Us! How awful! Let us hope that
it is not true, but if it is, let us pray that it will not
become generally known!”
In the first case, the mere announcement of the
measure had the desired effect, fully in line with
rational expectations theory. The second scenario
highlights the intention to essentially ignore
unwelcome information, or at least keep it in check.
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relation to a central bank. To what extent does a
central bank have to be transparent to fulfill the
accountability requirements of a democracy?
What is the impact of communication and trans-
parency on monetary policy efficiency and, hence,
on monetary policy objectives? Finally, what are
the implications for the communication policy
of the European Central Bank?
THE MIRAGE OF UNLIMITED
TRANSPARENCY
Today, there is a general consensus among
central bankers that transparency is not only an
obligation for a public entity, but also a real benefit
to the institution and its policies. For a long time,
however, central banks followed quite a different
tradition. Sometimes unwittingly, sometimes
quite deliberately—and very much in keeping
with the prevailing zeitgeist—they evinced an
air of discretion, to put it mildly. In the words of
a later scathing critic,
Central Banking [has been] traditionally
surrounded by a peculiar and protective
political mystique. The political mystique
of Central Banking was, and still is to some
extent, widely expressed by an essentially
metaphysical approach to monetary affairs
and monetary policy-making...The mys-
tique thrives on a pervasive impression
that Central Banking is an esoteric art.
Access to this art and its proper execution
is confined to the initiated elite. The eso-
teric nature of the art is moreover revealed
by an inherent impossibility to articulate
its insights in explicit and intelligible
words and sentences. Communication
with the uninitiated breaks down.
(Brunner, 1981)
There was a time when the Bank of England
could almost be classified as the epitome of reti-
cence vis-à-vis the public, and it was for this rea-
son that back in 1928 it was subject to increasing
criticism (King, 2004). The Deputy Governor at the
time, Sir Ernest Harvey, defended the Bank’s posi-
tion before the Macmillan Committee (Committee
on Finance and Industry, 1931, p. 27-31):
Committee member Gregory: “I should
like to ask you, Sir Ernest, whether you
have ever considered the possibility of
the Bank issuing an Annual Report on the
lines of the Annual Report of the Federal
Reserve Board, for instance?”
Deputy Governor Harvey: “I confess I am
sometimes nervous at the thought of
publication unless it is historical. The
question is whether, when it is merely
historical it is of any particular value, or
whether from the fact that it is issued from
the central bank undue importance may
be attributed to certain things that are
stated, more importance than perhaps
they merit...”
Committee member Keynes: “Arising from
Professor Gregory’s questions, is it a
practice of the Bank of England never to
explain what its policy is?”
Harvey: “Well, I think it has been our
practice to leave our actions to explain
our policy.”
Keynes: “Or the reasons for its policy?”
Harvey: “It is a dangerous thing to start to
give reasons.”
Keynes: “Or to defend itself against 
criticism?”
Harvey: “As regards criticism, I am afraid,
though the Committee may not all agree,
we do not admit there is need for defence;
to defend ourselves is somewhat akin to
a lady starting to defend her virtue.”
Imagine a central banker or representative of
whatever institution trying to use this kind of
argument today! Society demands transparency
from public institutions, with the result that laws
and even constitutions include appropriate pro-
visions.2 In the extreme, transparency means that
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2 See Article I-46 and Article I-49 of the draft version of the “Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe.” Almost 60 countries have
legislation on the freedom of information, determining which infor-
mation is to be made generally accessible by public institutions.
Similar legislative proposals are being discussed in 40 additional
countries.absolutely any information available should be
published. Any selection of information, any
retention of knowledge, would constitute a vio-
lation of the principle of transparency and would
thus breach the requirement to be accountable to
the public. 
Particularly in the case of institutions that
are granted the legal status of independence, the
demands for unlimited, absolute transparency as
a necessary counterpart of independence arise
almost inevitably. Furthermore, does additional
information not in any case have a welfare-
enhancing effect? Disregarding the costs of
procuring and processing information, does more
information not increase the expected utility of
decisionmakers (Blackwell, 1953)? Thus, a central
bank should be well advised and even be legally
obliged to publish all internal documents and data,
in particular those that are instrumental in its
monetary policy decisions and relate to its status
of independence. Such obligations of accounta-
bility would then also encompass information
regarding the decisionmaking process itself, any
differences of opinion, consensus agreements, a
majority voting behavior, etc.
Like any other public institution, a central
bank in a democratic society must fulfill certain
transparency requirements vis-à-vis its citizens.
Like any other institution? Just as an aside: Does
the call for the publication of minutes also extend
to government cabinet meetings or proceedings
in the courts of justice? Why not?
Back to central banks and monetary policy:
If communication and transparency requirements
are understood in this legal and political sense,
the extent to which information is transmitted
would be determined solely by the level of
demand on the part of the public. The central bank
would have no justification to limit its supply.
Pursuing this train of thought further, one
could easily imagine regular live broadcasts of
the meetings of central bank decisionmaking
bodies. One could, of course, object that in this
case discussions and straw votes would then
simply be moved outside public meetings. How-
ever, if one accepts the postulate of absolute
transparency, then the issue here is simply one
of enforceability of a legal obligation.
The further one pushes this postulate of
unlimited disclosure of information to its logical
conclusion, the more questions and objections
arise. Can the television broadcast alone provide
all the relevant information about the decision-
making process? Does one not also need to know
why one member voted one way and why another
member voted the other way? Is it perhaps due to
differences in the underlying economic philoso-
phies—a Keynesian as opposed to a monetarist
approach? Or maybe it is simply due to different
levels of preparation for the meeting? Would there
then not also be a need to televise the preparatory
meetings of the policymakers with their staff? And
likewise the preparations for these preparatory
meetings? Where would the cutoff point be?
The quest for absolute, unlimited transparency
about the decisionmaking process thus quickly
runs into practical difficulties. By contrast, the
case for publishing facts and figures seems to be
a fairly straightforward one—or at least at first
glance. But, even here, transparency can hardly be
tantamount to an obligation to publish everything
immediately. What stands in the way of such an
approach is the sheer volume of information that
would be unleashed, running the risk of blocking
the communication channel and overwhelming
recipients.3 A strict interpretation of a comprehen-
sive notion of the requirement for disclosure could
indeed allow an agent—and this is not just a hypo-
thetical consideration—to use communication to
deliberately orchestrate an information overflow in
order to act essentially unobserved behind a veil
of staged confusion. Mind you, we are talking here
only about an overflow of correct information. 
The data frequently represent a wide spectrum
of conditions, such as how timely they are and
how susceptible they are to revision—as well as
the frequency and timeliness of those revisions.
Moreover, data are often not self-explanatory, as
their information content changes depending on
the way they are communicated by the sender.
For this reason, even if a central bank wanted to,
it would not be able to avoid the need to select
information, qualify it, and comment on it. This
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3 Cf. Shannon’s (1948) mathematical theory of communication and
its application to macroeconomic and monetary policy issues in
Sims (2003) and Adam (2004).requirement, however, does not free it from its
obligation to render this process as transparent
as possible (see, e.g., ECB, 2004).
It is not my aim here to make a caricature of
the call for transparency in order to justify an
arbitrary limitation of information. In a democracy,
public institutions are not only obliged to be
accountable for their actions, they must also be
transparent in their behavior. This applies not least
to a central bank that has been granted extensive
legal independence and which therefore is not
even indirectly subject to electoral accountability.
However, any meaningful discussion on the
requirement for transparency cannot ignore the
question of what this implies in practice.
Demands for absolute, unlimited transparency
are met with instinctive approval, and any doubts
raised about it are met with emotional resistance.
We must therefore explain very carefully why the
requirement for absolute, unlimited transparency
carries with it insurmountable limits in both
theory and practice. Once an agreement on this
conclusion has been reached, it becomes clear




A famous legal case provides a good illustra-
tion of the issues involved. In March 1975, a stu-
dent at the Georgetown University Law Center,
David R. Merrill, filed an action against the Federal
Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) under the 1966 Freedom of Information
Act to request that it should publish the policy
directive and minutes directly after every meeting
(see Goodfriend, 1986). Following a judgment
from the District Court in favor of the plaintiff
and its confirmation by the Court of Appeal, the
case was finally referred to the United States
Supreme Court. In the end, the Supreme Court
decreed that the FOMC should be bound by an
immediate publication obligation unless it “would
significantly harm the Government’s monetary
functions or commercial interests.” (The reference
to “commercial interests” is based on the FOMC’s
argument that the Treasury would face signifi-
cantly higher borrowing costs.)
Consequently, the FOMC had to base its case
for nonpublication primarily on arguments from
monetary and financial theory, which is exactly
what Fed representatives tried to do in their state-
ments. In June 1981, the District Court, to which
the case had been redirected, ruled in favor of
the FOMC. Even though the Fed’s arguments at
the time did not appear to be completely convinc-
ing (Poole, 2003), the Court’s decision—perhaps
surprisingly—was nevertheless in line with some
findings in information theory that show that, in
a social context, additional information can
actually be detrimental (Hirshleifer, 1971, 1975;
Morris and Shin, 2002). Even if more information
increases the expected utility of the individual
(Blackwell, 1953), this does not necessarily
improve outcomes for society as a whole.
To the judge it was “apparent, however, upon
reviewing the affidavits that the dispute among
the experts in this case [was] not one over facts
in any objective sense, but rather [was] a dispute
over economic theory. It may in fact be finally
reducible to a dispute over proper monetary
policy.” Consequently, the judge ruled that “inso-
far as judgement pertaining to the validity of a
particular economic theory or the wisdom of a
particular policy are entrusted to the FOMC under
the auspices of Congress, the Court lacks the
expertise necessary to substitute its judgement
or that of plaintiff’s experts for that of the FOMC.”
A legal case thus translated into a dispute
over issues of economic theory. The dynamics of
this legal battle provide us with insights, however,
that can also be aimed at through quite a different
route. 
Any discussion on the communication and
transparency of monetary policy that starts off in
abstract terms and in isolation of the actual task
of a central bank is bound to lead to misunder-
standings. Transparency is not an end in itself; a
central bank is not established with the primary
objective of communicating with the public. Its
mandate either stems directly from the monetary
system, as was the case with the gold standard,
or is specified by the legislator, which became
necessary in times of the paper standard. Today,
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objectives—is generally to maintain price stability
or a low level of inflation. In this regard, central
banks act as agents in a principal-agent relation-
ship vis-à-vis society at large and in most cases
they have been granted independent status in
order to better fulfill their mandate. Central bank
accountability is therefore centered on the bank
fulfilling its mandate, rendering transparency
subordinate to their ultimate tasks and objectives.
It is precisely with this in mind that central banks
in the past have justified their reluctance to release
information to the public and their aura of “mys-
tique,” as criticized by Brunner. This stance puts
them in the territory identified by the U.S. courts.
Consequently, central banks are obliged to explain
their communication policy; they must justify
any withholding of information to the public,
such as information about the voting behavior of
members of the decisionmaking body, for example.
Obviously, their reasons must be related to the
fulfillment of their monetary policy task.
The aforementioned remarks of Deputy
Governor Harvey in the light of modern informa-
tion theory offer some interesting insights. He
justified his reservations about the usefulness of
an annual report by saying that “undue impor-
tance may be attributed to certain things that are
stated, more importance than perhaps they merit.”
Recent work on information theory has rediscov-
ered the conflict between public and private
information (Morris and Shin, 2002) and, among
other things, has shown that public information
can result in a crowding out of private informa-
tion and ultimately a welfare loss. Although no
one would question the usefulness of an annual
report today, the issue of its content has yet to be
resolved.
In addition, Harvey’s reasoning that “it has
been our practice to leave our actions to explain
our policy” is not as foolish as it may initially
seem, since it underlines a key aspect of the com-
munication problem. If a monetary policy decision
per se were to already include all relevant infor-
mation, it would simply suffice to announce it in
order to comply with transparent communication
requirements. This would be the case if monetary
policy reacted entirely mechanically to changes
in key parameters. Such rigid compliance with a
stringent rule would indeed rid monetary policy
of all discretionary elements and reduce communi-
cation, transparency, and accountability to the
publication of the respective decision—provided
the public were sufficiently well informed of the
rule and that strict adherence thereto were in line
with the mandate. This claim is precisely the one
made by Milton Friedman, for example, in his
well-known k-percent rule (Friedman, 1960).
Henry Simons used the motto “Rules versus
Authorities” to argue that the influence of indi-
viduals on monetary policy decisions should be
limited; and, as Walter Eucken postulated, a good
monetary constitution should function “as auto-
matically as possible” (Eucken, 1955, p. 257).
Strict adherence to rules solves the problem
of communication and transparency to the extent
that it does not allow for any discretion or personal
influence to be brought to bear in the decision
and its communication. Conversely, the public’s
need for information increases with the level of
discretion exercised in the monetary policy deci-
sion—the level of personal influence will also
rise accordingly—and involves a corresponding
need to convey the policy through communication
as well as action, thus simultaneously generating
a transparency and communication problem.
Interestingly, even apparently simple monetary
policy strategies, such as direct inflation targeting,
involve considerable communication require-
ments. In the end, inflation targeting still leaves
the central bank a significant amount of discre-
tionary leeway. For example, if inflation deviates
from the target rate, the central bank selects the
appropriate adjustment path toward the target.
The choice of path is left to the central bank and,
among other things, depends on the expected
impact on real economic activity (Friedman, 2004;
McCallum and Nelson, 2004).
Communication and transparency therefore
become discretionary issues; that is, they become
a balancing act for the central bank, which has to
assess the impact of communication on the effi-
ciency of monetary policy. Communication, not
least of all,  becomes crucial for steering market
expectations (Woodford, 2003).
Monetary policy can only fix central bank
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the very short end of the interest rate spectrum.
The influence of monetary policy on the long end
of the spectrum largely depends on market expec-
tations regarding future central bank decisions
and future inflation. Developments across the
entire yield curve and decisionmaking behavior
of economic agents across all markets depend
crucially on expectations as to whether and how
the central bank will fulfill its mandate.
Steering Market Expectations
Short-Term Signaling. The steering of finan-
cial market expectations has two dimensions:
First, it involves short-term indications on policy
inclinations in the run-up to monetary policy
decisions. In the simplest case, certain code
words suffice to signal an impending decision to
market participants. The search for such “codes”
is very popular among many market participants.
Code words can be readily identified and taken
into account in market operations; they can
reduce uncertainty in the run-up to meetings of
the decisionmaking body, and they can help to
avoid errors in the short-term planning of opera-
tions and curb the volatility of interest rates.
However, with the use of such code words, the
central bank puts itself under pressure to honor
a quasi-promise. If, in the meantime, its assess-
ment of the situation has changed, owing to new
developments, the central bank will be faced with
the dilemma of triggering market disturbances
if they “disappoint” expectations, even though
they may have convincing arguments to justify
their reassessment of the circumstances. For this
reason, indications about future decisions must
always be seen only as conditional commit-
ments. In practice, however, it is likely to prove
extremely difficult to communicate this proviso
with sufficient clarity. The more straightforward
the “announcement” and the simpler the code,
the more difficult it will be to explain its condi-
tionality ex ante.
If communication is understood (at least
broadly) as the unconditional announcement of
future decisions, the financial markets will reflect
(or “price in”) these expectations. “Thus, state-
ments and policy actions can serve as effective
substitutes for one another, at least in the short
run” (Kohn and Sack, 2003). It is obvious that a
strategy in which announcements take the place
of concrete action will become more risky the
longer the period over which expectations are to
be influenced.
Under no circumstances should a central bank
deliberately set out to unsettle the markets or even
give false information about its true intentions.
The world is unstable enough without a central
bank intentionally generating additional uncer-
tainty; greater volatility and ultimately higher
risk premia would be a high price to pay. At the
same time, the central bank must ensure that it
does not end up merely executing the expectations
developed in the market.
If monetary policy ends up merely following
the markets, it runs the risk of losing sight of its
ultimate objective. Monetary policy takes effect via
the financial markets, whose agents are directly
affected by monetary policy decisions. Misper-
ceptions of monetary policy activity can cost them
dearly. Consequently, praise and complaints from
the markets have understandably become perma-
nent companions of monetary policy. Central
banks are therefore exposed to the temptation of
attributing an importance to market reactions that
goes beyond their “transmission” interest. Alan
Blinder concludes his remarkable book entitled
“Central Banking in Theory and Practice” (1998,
p. 76) with this warning: “Following the markets
too closely...may lead the central bank to inherit
precisely the short time horizon that central bank
independence is meant to prevent. There is no
more reason for central bankers to take their
marching orders from bond traders than to take
their orders from politicians.” In the longer term,
however, I believe this conflict will disappear. A
central bank can successfully use the markets in
the long term only if, in fulfilling its mandate, it
gains the confidence not only of the public at large
but also of the financial markets.
Longer-Term Consistency. There is, however,
a second dimension to the predictability of deci-
sions. In the medium to longer term, it becomes
a question of consistency between the sum of
individual decisions and the announced longer-
term objectives of monetary policy. If such con-
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able and credible in the long term. Reconciling
the two different dimensions of predictability is
and will remain one of the main requirements
of communication and monetary policy per se.
Ensuring such consistency in decisions relat-
ing to its mandate is the key requirement of a
central bank’s monetary policy strategy. If a central
bank pursues a consistent strategy and succeeds
in communicating it convincingly, it will play an
important role in successfully steering expecta-
tions. One element of such a strategy is to provide
some (implicit) indication of how monetary policy
is likely to deal with exogenous shocks to supply
and demand. Another element relates to the poten-
tial reaction to such shocks—gradual versus abrupt
measures. Providing indications on the monetary
policy reaction function enhances predictability
over a more medium-term horizon. If a central
bank is reliable in this sense, it is much easier for
it to gain credibility and win the trust of the public
and the markets alike. In this regard, all efforts
must focus on anchoring inflation expectations
at a level that is in line with the mandate and,
where appropriate, with price stability or an infla-
tion target.
As far as steering medium- to longer-term
expectations is concerned, credibility is essential.
First and foremost, credibility is won through
systematic, coherent actions. “A central bank that
consistently performs in a particular way will
have credibility even if the market has little or no
idea of what the objective is or how the central
bank achieves it. The saying that ‘actions speak
louder than words’ is particularly true when it
comes to credibility. In the final analysis, credi-
bility is earned—there is simply no other way to
get it” (Thornton, 2002, p. 11).
A good track record, however, does not elim-
inate the need for a good communication policy.
First, such a track record is not available to a new
institution. Second, if the monetary policy strategy
is not clearly communicated, there is a tendency
for market participants to adjust their longer-term
expectations (e.g., their inflation expectations)
in line with the current circumstances (i.e., the
current inflation rate). If there is no credible strat-
egy in place, economic agents try, by means of
an adaptive learning process, to use the available
data to second-guess the current thinking of the
central bank. Short-term deviations of the infla-
tion rate from the inflation target then result in
adjustments to the expected inflation rate. Under
such circumstances, determining and implement-
ing monetary policy will become considerably
more difficult (see Orphanides and Williams,
2002). The challenge for communication policy
is to provide convincing reasons for any devia-
tions from target and to provide reassurance that
these developments are only temporary. Long-term
inflation expectations that remain in line with
the central bank’s objective are a confirmation of
credibility, which, in turn, facilitates the conduct
of monetary policy.
An appropriate strategy, a convincing track
record, and thus a consistent communication
policy complement each other and are a sign of
an effective monetary policy. A clear strategy can
also provide stability to the analytical framework
and decisionmaking process for monetary policy.
After all, the individuals responsible for monetary
policy decisions will change over time and there
is a need to convince the public that continuity
of good policies is ensured.
An important task of a central bank is also to
explain to the public the limits of its mandate and
abilities to achieve the associated goals. This
approach is necessary to avoid raising false expec-
tations that will not be met, resulting in a loss of
credibility for central bank policies overall. For
example, monetary policy can control inflation
only in the medium-to-long term. Volatile com-
ponents of the price index (e.g., energy and food
prices) can lead to significant fluctuations in
inflation rates in the short term. The central bank’s
reputation could be tarnished if the public
believed that the central bank was able, on a sus-
tainable basis, not only to guarantee a low level
of inflation but also to use monetary policy meas-
ures to boost growth and employment.
This highlights a further communication
challenge with the public as well as with govern-
ments and parliaments. Politicians time and again
try to blame central banks for unfavorable macro-
economic developments such as high unemploy-
ment and low growth. Maintaining monetary
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depends on whether or not the central bank wins
over public opinion (Issing, 2002).
No doubt, there is significant interest in central
bank transparency on both the “supply side,” the
central bank, and the “demand side,” the public.
The public’s interest in transparency with
regard to monetary policy’s fulfillment of its
mandate is essentially in line with the central
bank’s interest in using this channel as a means
of enhancing monetary policy efficiency. In an
ideal world, the optimum amount of information
is determined by the point where the supply and
demand curves intersect.4 However, the question




Successful communication is one of the
greatest challenges for monetary policy. The more
convincingly central banks can explain the rea-
sons for their monetary policy decisions to the
public, the more effective their monetary policy
will be. For this reason central banks publish
extensive information about their strategy, analy-
ses, and decisions.
Experience has shown, however, how difficult
it is to communicate to the public all information
relevant to the decisionmaking process in a way
that is not only exhaustive but also clear and com-
prehensible. Psychological research has pointed
to the limits of human information processing
skills (Kahneman, 2003). This research has shown,
for example, that the weighting of information
greatly depends on its intuitive accessibility.
Furthermore, information is generally simplified
and categorized before it is collated. A central
bank’s communication policy is therefore faced
with the task of conveying the necessary infor-
mation clearly and with the appropriate emphasis
and salience.
At the same time, a central bank must also
convey that monetary policy decisions are com-
plex and that the monetary policy environment
is uncertain and constantly changing. There is
uncertainty about prevailing economic conditions
and the nature and extent of economic shocks.
There is model and parameter uncertainty and
uncertainty regarding the market expectation
process.
One approach would be to use precise,
unambiguous words to portray complex facts
without, at the same time, giving the impression
that the world is more straightforward and secure
than it actually is.
Striking the balance between the need for
clear and simple messages and the need to ade-
quately convey complexity is a constant challenge
for central bank communication (Winkler, 2000).
An additional difficulty stems from the need to
address various target groups, including aca-
demics, the markets, politicians, and the general
public. Such a broad spectrum may require a vari-
ety of communication channels geared to different
levels of complexity or different time horizons.
COMMUNICATION IN PRACTICE
In order for this balancing act to be successful,
central banks today use a variety of instruments
(see Appendix Tables A1 and A2).
The wide array of communication instruments
ranges from short press releases after monetary
policy decisions to the publication of voting
results, regular monthly or quarterly reports to
the customary annual reports, as well as speeches
and other contributions from central bank repre-
sentatives. 
The ECB has decided to publish neither the
minutes of the Governing Council nor information
about the voting behavior of its members, but
instead holds an extensive monthly press con-
ference directly after the Council meetings. The
decision not to publish minutes and voting records
has been a criticism frequently leveled at the ECB,
casting doubts on its determination to be trans-
parent and accountable (Buiter, 1999; de Haan
and Eijffinger, 2000).
The critics often overlook the collegial nature
of the ECB’s decisionmaking process and the
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of transparency to be transferred to society and not left to the central
bank. See also Neumann (2002).specific institutional circumstances under which
the ECB operates as a supranational institution.
A decisionmaking body is always more than
just the sum of its individual members, just as a
decision is more than an act of voting. A decision
is the result of collective deliberation and debate
and cannot be reduced to a simple exchange of
opinions (Issing, 1999). The public will ultimately
judge the success of an institution against its man-
date. What matters, then, is the collective respon-
sibility of the monetary policy decisionmaking
body for the decisions taken.
Any attempt to make individual policymakers
personally accountable by publishing information
about their voting behavior entails the risk that the
public may attach more importance to individual
opinions than to the relevant economic arguments.
Particularly in a monetary union comprising
several countries, the voting behavior of national
central bank governors in particular might be inter-
preted from a “national” perspective—irrespective
of how the members cast their votes and their
reasons for doing so (see also Eijffinger and
Hoeberichts, 2002, and Neumann, 2002, p. 360).
In its communication policy and its choice of
medium, form, and content, a central bank needs
to take into account particular circumstances. As
a new institution, the ECB was faced with high
uncertainty when it first took over responsibility
for the single monetary policy for a new currency
area comprising eleven, later twelve, sovereign
countries (see Issing, 2004).
Against this background, the ECB adopted
its own approach to communication: From the
beginning, it placed a premium on speaking “with
one voice” and consensus in decisionmaking,
while spelling out the underlying economic argu-
ments clearly and consistently.
By publicly announcing an explicit monetary
policy strategy and a quantitative definition of
price stability in 1998, the ECB has provided the
basis for a high degree of credibility from the very
beginning and has also highlighted its commit-
ment to be open and transparent.
The public announcement of a quantitative
definition of price stability helps the public to
better monitor and assess the performance of the
ECB. Furthermore, the ECB, like many other cen-
tral banks, describes the analytical framework
used for its internal decisionmaking and explains
which models, methods, and indicators form the
basis of its decisions and assessments. A publicly
announced strategy provides guidance for the
markets, enabling them to form expectations more
efficiently, enabling them to better anticipate
interest rate decisions.5
The President’s monthly press conference
provides a timely and comprehensive summary
of the monetary policy–relevant assessment of
economic developments. It is structured along
the lines of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy
and its text is agreed upon by the Governing
Council. Questions from journalists are then
answered, with the written transcript of the press
conference published on the ECB’s website only
a few hours later.
The ECB decided to adopt a regular real-time
communication tool instead of publishing with
some delay.6 Immediate communication avoids
the risk that a delay in the announcement of the
reasons behind the monetary policy decision
could affect the markets and increase volatility.
Overall, the ECB’s communication policy is
an expression of general principles and it has also
been shaped by the particular challenges it faced
as a new institution.
5 Empirical tests show that, with regard to the predictability of its
decisions, the ECB’s communication policy will easily stand up to
any comparison (see, for example, Gaspar, Pérez-Quirós, and Sicilia,
2001; Bernoth and von Hagen, 2004; and Bank for International
Settlements, 2004, p. 86; also, Poole and Rasche, 2003, provide
evidence regarding the Federal Reserve).
6 The term “minutes,” per se, directly implies transparency and
authenticity regarding the course of a meeting. In this sense, the
tradeoff between immediate and delayed publication (whether
longer or shorter) is often overlooked. The Federal Open Market
Committee discussed this in its January 27-28, 2004, meeting (see
FOMC Minutes [sic!], 2004): “In further discussion the members
reviewed the potential value and drawbacks of accelerating the
publication of Committee minutes. Possible benefits would include
the provision of more complete information sooner after meetings
on the considerations that led the Committee to adopt the current
stance of policy. Some members expressed concern, however, that
accelerated release of the minutes might have the potential to feed
back adversely on the deliberations of the Committee and on the
minutes themselves. The members also emphasized the importance
of allowing sufficient time for them to review and comment on
the minutes and for reconciling differences of opinion among the
members of a large and geographically dispersed committee. On
December 14, 2004, the FOMC decided to expedite the release of
its minutes to three weeks after the date of the policy decision.
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If there were any general conclusion to be
drawn on the subject of “Communication, Trans-
parency, and Accountability,” then it would be
this: None of these elements should be considered
in isolation. Their interdependence stems from
the monetary policy mandate and the position of
the central bank in society. The central bank is not
only obliged to fulfill its mandate, it must also
provide society with convincing reasons for its
actions. Whatever the external perception of the
central bank, there must be no doubt that all com-
munications are made to the best of its knowledge
and belief.
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APPENDIX
Table A1
Communication: Instruments, Channels, and Target Groups
Instruments Format Channels When Fr
Immediate announcement/explanation 
of monetary policy decisions
Press releases Written Website/hard copy Immediately after the 
monetary policy meeting
Press conference Verbal, with question and answer  Direct communication,  Shortly after the 
session, sometimes includes  TV broadcast (live or  monetary policy meeting
handing out of written background  report later that day)
information to media representatives 
(e.g., opinion of the central bank 
president, projections, etc.)
Transcript of the press conference Written Website/hard copy Shortly after the press 
conference has finished
Supplementary information on 
monetary policy decisions
Publication of the minutes of meetings Written Website/hard copy Between 13 days and 
8 weeks after the 
monetary policy meeting
Publication of voting behavior Written Website/hard copy Together with the press 
release and/or minutes 
of the meeting
Further information on monetary 
policy and economic developments
Reports (monthly bulletin, annual report, etc.) Written Website/hard copy
Publication of projections Written Website/hard copy
Publication of statistical data Written Website/hard copy As soon as confirmed
Publication of surveys Written Website/hard copy
Public hearings/report to the legislature Verbal/written Live reporting, print 
media, website/hard copy
Interviews Verbal or written TV, radio, and/or print mediaIssing
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Frequency Detail Content Target group ECB
Regularly Brief, in some cases  Monetary policy decision,  General public,  Yes
information is reduced to  sometimes a brief  media, markets
key words and formulae explanation, monetary policy 
intentions, and announcement 
of voting behavior
Regularly Extensive Explanation of the monetary policy  General public,  Yes
decision, assessment of the current  media, markets
economic situation and its future 
development, sometimes comments 
on other policy areas
Regularly Extensive Explanation of the monetary policy  General public,  Yes
decision, assessment of the current  media, markets
economic situation and its future 
development, sometimes comments 
on other policy areas
Regularly Extensive Information on the course of meetings  General public,  No
and discussions (presentation of the  media, markets
reasons behind the monetary policy 
decision, policy options, etc.)
Regularly Brief Presentation of the voting behavior,  General public,  No
explanation of dissenting positions media, markets
Monthly/quarterly/ Extensive Analysis of monetary policy issues  General public,  Yes
annually and assessment of the current economic  media, markets
environment, special topics, etc.
Quarterly/biannually Extensive Analysts, ECB  Yes
observers, interested 
members of the public
Regularly Extensive Money and banking statistics,  Analysts, ECB Yes
balance of payments statistics, etc. observers, interested
members of the public
Regularly Extensive Analysts, interested Yes
members of the public
Regularly Extensive Explanation of monetary  Politicians, ECB  Yes
answering of questions observers, interested
members of the public
Regularly Brief to extensive Key monetary policy issues (mandate,  National or regional  Yes
strategy, decisions), special topics,  public, media, markets
current problems regarding economic 
policy (fiscal policy, structural policy), 
topics of regional interest, etc.Issing
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Table A1 cont’d
Communication: Instruments, Channels, and Target Groups
Instruments Format Channels When Fr
Further information on monetary 
policy and economic developments
Speeches Verbal Direct interaction; TV, radio, 
and/or reporting in the media 
(in most cases also website/hard copy) 
Briefings Verbal Central bank representatives 
meet with journalists in person
Monetary policy research
Research papers Written Publications in hard copy/on website
Conferences Verbal/written Direct interaction and open dialogue, 
sometimes with media presence, 
subsequently also website/hard copy
Transfer of monetary policy knowledge
Presentations/visitor groups Verbal Direct interaction
Information leaflets Written Website/hard copy
Video/video games Audio-visual Website/presentation
School competitions Verbal and written Direct interactionIssing
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Frequency Detail Content Target group ECB
Regularly Brief to extensive Key monetary policy issues (mandate,  Specific Yes
strategy, decisions), special topics, 
current problems regarding economic 
policy (fiscal policy, structural policy), 
topics of regional interest, etc.
In most cases  Extensive Explanation of reactions, opinions,  Media representatives Yes
irregularly;  central bank assessments, in order 
in some cases  to make monetary policy decisions 
also regularly more intelligible
Regularly Specialized, sometimes  Specialized fields, studies on  Academics, interested  Yes
highly complicated monetary policy from a general  members of the public
and academic point of view
Regularly Specialized, sometimes  Specialized fields, studies on  Academics, interested  Yes
highly complicated monetary policy from a general  members of the public
and academic point of view
Regularly Brief to extensive Range from a simple presentation  School pupils, students,  Yes
to a detailed explanation of basic  CEOs, interested 
monetary policy issues members of the public
Regularly Brief to extensive Range from a simple presentation  Children, teenagers,  Yes
to a detailed explanation of basic  teachers, students, 
monetary policy issues interested members 
of the public
Regularly Brief to extensive Range from a simple presentation  Children, teenagers,  Yes
to a detailed explanation of basic  teachers, students, 
monetary policy issues interested members 
of the public
Regularly Extensive Pedagogical introduction  Teenagers, teachers No
to the monetary policy 
decisionmaking processIssing
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Table A2
Communication of Policy Decisions of Selected Central Banks
Central banks/countries ECB Czech Republic Norway Poland Sweden
EARLY COMMUNICATION ON POLICY 
DECISIONS
Announcement of policy decision
Press release Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y
Frequency (times per year) 12 12 9 12 8 4
After all monetary policy meetings? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y
Explanation of policy decisions
Press release
More than just the decision? No No Yes No Yes Y
Number of pages No No 3 No 11/2
Press conference
When is there a press conference?
Frequency (times per year) 11 12 9 12 Quarterly and 
if rates are 
changed
After all monetary policy meetings? Yes (except  Yes Yes Yes No
in August)
Since when? December 1998 2000 June 1999 January 2001 Early 1990s
Delay after announcement 45 minutes 2-3 hours 45 minutes 2-4 hours 90 minutes or
4 hours3
Practice for all press conferences
Support used
Media “Introductory  Presentation  Summary of the  “Information from a  Presentation 
statement” with charts press release itself  meeting of the  with slides
and presentation  Monetary Policy 
with charts Council”and 
presentation with 
charts and tables
Length 3 pages 5-10 slides 5 slides (more  2-3 pages and  10 slides on 
on the Internet) around 20 slides average
Published? Yes No Yes Yes (the statement,  Yes Y
but not the slides)
Q&A
Is there a Q&A session? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Y
Is a transcript published? Yes No No No No
In which format? Internet No No No No
Broadcasting
Is the press conference broadcast? Yes, live No Yes, live Yes, but not always Yes, live Y
In which format? Bloomberg TV No Internet TVNZ InternetIssing
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Switzerland U.K. Australia Canada Japan New Zealand U.S.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4 12 11 8 15-19 8 8
Yes1 Yes Yes Yes1 Yes Yes1 Yes
Yes Yes (but at MPC’s Yes (but only if  Yes Yes Yes Yes
discretion) rates changed)
321 /4 1 1/2-1 1/221 /2-1 1/2
Half-yearly No No No 16 (in 2004) Quarterly No
No No No No Yes No No
1974 No No No October 2003 Late 1999 No
No No No No A few hours No No
“Introductory remarks” No No No “The Bank’s view”of  Chapter 1  No
the “Monthly Report  (“Policy assessment”) 
of Recent Economic  of the “Monetary 
and Financial Developments” Policy Statement”
(after 1st meeting of  (report)4
the month)
3 pages No No No 2 pages 1/2-1 page and report No
Yes No No No Yes Yes No
Yes No No No Yes Yes No
No No No No No5 No No
No No No No No5 No No
Yes, sometimes, live No No No Yes, just after  Yes, live No
end of conference
Bloomberg TV No No No Bloomberg TV Telesky TV NoIssing
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Table A2 cont’d
Communication of Policy Decisions of Selected Central Banks
Central banks/countries ECB Czech Republic Norway Poland Sweden
Support available at some 
press conferences
Document Section on projections “Inflation Report” “Inflation Report”
Frequency Quarterly 3 times a year Quarterly
Number of pages 5 70 60
When is it available? At end of conference When decision  When decision 




Minutes published? No Yes No No Yes
Number of pages No 1-2 No No 5-9
Delay No 12 days No No 2 weeks
Other publications
Publication or media “Monthly Bulletin” “Inflation Report” “Inflation Report” “
After all monetary policy meetings? Yes No, quarterly No, 4 times per year Y
Timing 1 week after 1 week after 1 week after
NOTE: The table focuses on pre-scheduled monetary policy meetings, unless otherwise specified. Frequencies and lengths of documents
are approximate (in terms of comparable pages in the ECB’s Introductory Statements). Where the documents are reports, their lengths 
are not indicated (as they depend inter alia on the layout used and are not easily comparable).
Country notes: 1In the cases of Switzerland, Canada, and New Zealand, dates of policy-decision releases instead of meeting dates are 
pre-announced. 2Switzerland: Half a page for half-yearly meetings (followed by further explanation at the press conference) and three 
pages for the other two meetings. Japan: About half a page if the stance of monetary policy is kept unchanged, somewhat longer 
otherwise (e.g., new measures taken). 3Sweden: Twice a year the Governor appears before the finance committee of the Riksdag. On 
these occasions, the press release is published at 9 a.m. and the press conference starts at 1 p.m. 4New Zealand: Released at the media 
lock-ups for four of the eight interest rate decisions throughout the year. 5Japan: Minutes of the conference are posted on the Internet 
on the day after the conference. 6United States: The Federal Reserve System publishes a number of reports that provide considerable 
additional background on monetary policy decisions, including the semi-annual monetary policy report to Congress.Issing
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Switzerland U.K. Australia Canada Japan New Zealand U.S.
No No No “The Bank’s view”of  No
the “Outlook for Economic 
Activity and Prices”
No No No Twice a year No
No No No 3-4 No
No No No Before press  No
conference starts
No Yes No No Yes No Yes
No 20 No No 15-30 No 7-10
No 13 days No No 4-6 weeks No 5-8 weeks
“Quarterly  “Inflation Report” “Statement on  “Monetary Policy  a) “Monthly Report of  Report 
Bulletin” and press  Monetary Policy” Report” Recent Economic and  to Congress6
conference (report) Financial Developments”
b) “Outlook for Economic 
Activity and Prices”
Yes No, quarterly No, quarterly No, biannual  a) No, monthly  No, biannual
and two updates b) Twice a year 
(for 2nd meeting 
in month: April 
and October)
Approximately  6 days after Between meetings 2 days after  1 working day after 
5 weeks after announcement a) 1st meeting 
of month or 
b) 2nd meeting 
of month 
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